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JOINT VERSUS SEPARATE FILING: 
JOINT RETURN TAX RATES AND 
FEDERAL COMPLICITY IN 
DIRECTING ECONOMIC 
RESOURCES FROM WOMEN TO MEN 
AMY c. CHRISTIAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In many respects, the economic institutions of United States soci-
ety are set up to benefit men, often at women's expense. For men to 
benefit, they simply must be. Benefit flows to them automatically. 
For women to benefit within these economic structures, they must act, 
either through affirmative negotiation or by lobbying to reform the 
institution. To extract the benefits that flow to men automatically, 
women must do much more than simply be. The legal system is one 
economic institution that has, at times, exhibited this pattern. It 
responds to social realities in a way that often causes benefits to flow 
to men automatically but not to women. Social practices and legal 
rules tend to combine to create biases in favor of men, sometimes at 
women's expense. This phenomenon occurs in the current U.S. tax 
system with regard to the joint return filing system and the operation 
of joint return tax rates in comparison to the rates that apply to mar-
ried taxpayers who file separately. How and why this pattern occurs is 
the subject of this essay. Specifically, this essay explains how joint 
return rates force many women to transfer wealth to their higher-
* Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University; B.S.B.A., 
Georgetown University, School of Business Administration, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 
1991. I am indebted to Edward J. McCaffery, Susan H. Bitensky, Robert A. McCormick and 
Lawrence A. Zelenak for reviewing a previous version of this essay. This essay is based on a 
longer article that appears in the current issue of the University of Vrrginia's Journal of Law and 
Politics. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & PoL. 241 {1997). 
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income husbands on an annual basis and create conflicts for women 
that are not imposed on men. 
Part II of this essay lays a technical foundation for Part III and 
briefly describes a few features of joint return filing that have been 
described in previous legal literature and that are of particular con-
cern to women. Part m describes my own recent contribution in the 
same field, namely that joint filing often functions in the social setting 
to require wives to transfer wealth to their husbands. Furthermore, 
the rate structure tends to impose conflicts on women that it fails to 
impose on men. Part IV briefly mentions that reform proposals 
directed at solving the problems raised in Part II would also eliminate 
the problems identified in Part ill. Finally, Part V concludes this 
essay by tying the joint return transfer-of-wealth problem back to the 
larger theme of how our socio-legal institutions are frequently 
designed to benefit men automatically but not women. 
II. TECHNICAL COMPONENTS OF JOINT RETURN TAX 
RATES AND PREVIOUS LEGAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE JOINT RETURN RATE STRUCTURE 
Joint and separate return rates are related to each other by the 
concepts of income splitting and aggregation. Those two features are 
present in the joint return rates and cause a couple to be taxed under 
joint rates as if each spouse had earned separately half of the aggre-
gate or combined net income. Income splitting permits income from 
the higher-bracket earner to be shifted into the other spouse's lower 
bracket for purposes of tax computation1 and effects a tax savings for 
1. Allowing income to be shifted from the higher-earning to the lower-earning spouse for 
purposes of computing tax liability is a problem for women because it does not require that 
income be shifted from husband to wife for ownership purposes as well. See Pamela B. Gann, 
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1, 27 
(1980); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 990 & n.21 (1993)(noting the incongruity of shifting 
income for tax purposes when it is not shifted for ownership purposes); Toni Robinson & Mary 
Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Tune: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. 
TAX REv. 773, 775 n.4 (1989); Jeannette Anderson Wmn & Marshall Winn, Till Death Do We 
Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. REv. 829, 
878 (1983); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 380 (1994); 
Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 
62 S. CAL. L. REv. 197, 198, 215, 236, 240-48 (1988); cf. Zelenak, supra, at 378-79, 386 (noting 
that by permitting income to be split only if property is actually transferred to the non-earning 
spouse, an incentive would arise for husbands to share legal ownership of earnings with their 
wives). 
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the couple as a unit when the couple files jointly.2 Under aggregation, 
when spouses file jointly, their incomes are added together prior to 
the application of the tax rates. Because U.S. tax rates are progres-
sive, aggregation causes some of the spouses' combined income to be 
taxed at higher marginal rates than would have applied to their 
incomes separately. Aggregation thereby imposes additional tax on 
couples who file jointly rather than separately. Income splitting and 
aggregation are both components of and are built into the joint return 
rates? That is, under joint filing, spouses are treated as one taxpayer, 
and that one taxpayer reports both sources of income, moving into a 
higher tax bracket. However, the tax rates rise half as quickly-that 
is, tax brackets are twice as wide relative to the rate schedule for mar-
ried couples who file separately to allow for what is, in effect, income 
splitting.4 Joint return rates are related to separate return rates in that 
a joint return tax liability may be derived by applying the separate 
return tax rates to half of the spouses' combined net income and mul-
tiplying the resulting tax by two.5 
The existence of both income splitting and aggregation in joint 
return rates has a number of consequences that have been described 
in previous legal and economic literature. First, income splitting and 
2. Income splitting was adopted in 1948 as a response to a perceived geographic disparity. 
Residents of community property states were allowed to split their incomes for beneficial tax 
computation purposes because state law split ownership of earnings between the two spouses 
equally. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Residents of common-law jurisdictions were, 
by contrast, denied the benefits of income splitting because state law conferred on the non-
earning spouse no present property interest in the other spouse's earnings. See Lucas v. Earl, 
281 U.S. 111 (1930). As a result, community property residents were favored with more benefi-
cial tax treatment than were residents of common law states. I denote this disparity in treatment 
as merely a perceived disparity because similarly situated taxpayers were not being treated dis-
similarly. Rather, the tax system was treating different taxpayers differently. The community 
property and common law residents were different with respect to the important issue of 
whether the non-earner spouse had a present ownership interest in the other's earnings. Con-
gress' concern about perceived geographic disparity prompted it to equalize the treatment of 
these differently situated taxpayers to forestall a massive conversion by common law states to 
the community property system. S. REP. No. 80-1013, pt. VIII, at 18-19 (1948), reprinted in 1948-
1 C.B. 285, 302. Congress did so in 1948 by incorporating income splitting into the joint return. 
3. The aggregation feature of joint rates was adopted in 1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, 
ch. 136, § 223(b)(2), 42 Stat 227, 250. Income splitting was not incorporated into those rates 
until 1948. See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114. 
4. Compare the brackets contained in I.R.C. § 1(a) (West Supp. 1997) for married tax-
payers filing jointly with those of I.R.C. § 1(d) (West Supp. 1997) for married taxpayers filing 
separately. 
5. Assuming a husband earned $100,000 and his wife earned $40,000, their joint return 
liability could be derived by applying the separate return rates to $70,000 and then by doubling 
the resulting tax. Essentially each spouse would be treated as if he or she earned half of his or 
her own income plus half of the income earned by his or her spouse. 
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aggregation each operate independently to favor couples in which 
only one spouse works and to disfavor those in which spousal incomes 
are similar, that is, in which both spouses undertake paid labor. Not 
surprisingly, both features, operating through the joint return rates, 
combine to exacerbate this privileging of single-earner couples over 
two-earner couples. This pattern is thought to have the powerful sym-
bolic effect of legitimizing only traditional marital roles in which solely 
the husband is gainfully employed. By favoring disparate-income 
couples, the joint rates thereby penalize those who challenge tradi-
tional marital roles, couples in which both spouses perform paid 
labor.6 
Second, the favoring of single-earner couples not only sends legit-
imizing messages to them but is also thought to affect behavior. By 
penalizing two-earner couples relative to single-earner couples, the 
joint rates probably encourage conventional marriage roles in which 
the husband works and the wife does not, thereby discouraging actual 
labor-force participation among wives. Many tax scholars have 
described how aggregation probably discourages wives from partici-
pating in the paid labor force by subjecting their first dollars earned to 
the highest marginal rates of their husbands? Essentially, the tax rate 
on the secondary earner's first dollar of income is determined by her 
6. These patterns have been described in Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate 
Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the I940s, 6 LAw & HIST. REv. 259, 261 (1988) (discussing 
impact of automatic income splitting on spouses' roles). See also Gann, supra note 1, at 35 
(stating that the split-income structure is designed to benefit the group of taxpaying couples in 
which only one spouse works); Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA 
WoMEN's L.J. 289, 308-09 (1996); McCaffery, supra note 1, at 987, 992 & n.29 (noting that the 
tax laws encourage single-earner families); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 1, at 793 n.92 (noting 
that the tax laws, as reflections of social judgments about lifestyles, reward conformity to tradi-
tional roles and penalize departures from them); Zelenak, supra note 1, at 340-41 (noting that 
the single-earner couple benefits from income splitting). 
7. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxa-
tion of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1971); Gann, supra note 1, at 41; 
McCaffery, supra note 1, at 993; Zelenak, supra note 1, at 365; Davis, supra note 1, at 210. Only 
Professor Mcintyre has written in opposition to this view. He questions economic studies that 
have been interpreted to say that wives' labor supply is more discouraged under the current rate 
structure than is that of husbands, he assumes that spouses share their resources to a large 
extent, and he argues that tax rates are blind as to which spouse's income is assigned to the lower 
versus the higher tax brackets. See Michael Mcintyre, Economic Mutuality and the Need for 
Joint Filing, CAN. TAX., Wmter 1979, at 13; Michael J. Mcintyre, Individual Filing in the Personal 
Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REv. 469 (1980) [hereinafter Mcin-
tyre, Prolegomena]; Michael J. Mcintyre, Tax Justice for Family Members After New York State 
Tax Reform, 51 ALB. L. REv. 789 (1987). However, he ignores the social realities that wives tend 
to earn substantially less than their husbands, that wives generally have more household and 
child care responsibilities than do husbands, and that, consequently, most couples view the wife's 
paid work effort as being more discretionary than that of the husband. 
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husband's income rather than by the lowest tax rate. I argue in a 
recent article that the income-splitting feature of the joint return rate 
structure also discourages married women from participating in the 
paid work force.8 Joint return rates .probably discourage married 
women on the margin from entering the work force or from remaining 
in it upon marrying and, in that regard, are biased against women.9 
A third consequence of income splitting and aggregation is that 
they create an economic incentive for couples to file jointly rather 
than separately whenever spouses' incomes differ, that is, whenever 
one spouse earns more than the other.10 The greater the income dif-
ferences between husband and wife, the more valuable is the benefit 
from income splitting and the smaller is the harm from income aggre-
gation, and thus, the greater is the couple's financial benefit from fil-
ing jointly rather than separately. Writing when disparate incomes 
were virtually universal, Professor Boris Bittker acknowledged this 
incentive in the rate structure, noting that joint returns, while elective 
as a technical matter, are "mandatory in fact.'111 As long as one 
spouse earns more than the other, a financial incentive will induce 
spouses to elect joint return status. Even when incomes are equal, 
couples have no financial incentive relating to the rate structure to file 
separately. It will later be shown that this behavioral incentive for 
couples to file jointly, rather than separately, essentially locks women 
8. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & PoL. 241, 265, 279-82 (1997); see also Jane H. Leu-
thold, Income Splitting and Women's Labor-Force Participation, 38lNnus. & LAB. REL. REv. 98 
(1984). 
9. Statistical and economic studies support the proposition that higher taxes on wives dis-
courage their labor force participation by demonstrating that a married woman's earnings are 
more tax sensitive than are those of a married man. See, e.g., STAFF OF JoiNT CoMM. oN TAXA-
TION, 96th Cong., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MAruuEo CoUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 
5, 64 (Comm. Print 1980) ("VIrtually all statistical studies of the issue conclude that a wife's work 
effort is more responsive to reduced taxes than her husband's."); Jerry A. Hausman, Labor Sup-
ply, in How TAXES AFFECT EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR 27, 28, 55-58 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. 
Pechman eds., 1981); Leuthold, supra note 8, at 98, 103-04; Thomas MaCurdy, Work Disincentive 
Effects of Taxes: A Reexamination of Some Evidence, 82 AM. EcoN. REv.: PAPERS AND PRoc. OF 
THE 104m ANNuAL MEETING OF THE AM. EcoN. Ass'N 243 (1992); Harvey S. Rosen, Tax Illu-
sion and the Labor Supply of Married Women, 58 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 167 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 
425 (1977). 
11. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1409 
n.55 (1975); see also Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liabil-
ity for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REv. 317, 372 (1990) (explaining that 
"[t]he tax system is designed almost to force married persons to file jointly rather than 
separately."). 
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into damaging patterns that exist in the joint rate structure even 
though those patterns substantially disadvantage women. 
III. THE IMPACT OF JOINT RATES AS BETWEEN THE 
SPOUSES 
A. COERCED ANNuAL TRANSFERS OF WEALTH FROM WIVES TO 
THEIR HUSBANDS 
The very features of joint filing that cause the disincentive against 
wives to work and that favor disparate-income couples over equal~ 
income couples, also combine to cause a separate and distinct problem 
for women who live in common law states. In common law states, 
income splitting and aggregation operate in conjunction with a variety 
of well-entrenched social forces to create a pattern of coerced annual 
transfers of wealth from women to menP I first exposed this pattern 
in a longer article that appears in the current issue of the University of 
Virginia's Journal of Law and PoliticsP I will not repeat all the 
details here, but will set forth an exposition of the primary points of 
that argument to explain how this previously unidentified pattern 
occurs. 
Upon filiQ.g jointly, income splitting and aggregation combine to 
reduce the tax attributable to the higher-earning spouse and to 
increase the tax attributable to the lower-earning spouse. Income 
splitting and aggregation combine to give the higher-earning spouse 
an income-splitting benefit which is only partially offset by the harm 
from aggregation. Tl;le higher-earning spouse adds half the income of 
the other spouse to half of his or her own income, and thereby moves 
into a tax bracket that is lower than the one that would have applied 
had his or her own income been taxed separately. In this manner the 
combination of income splitting and aggregation benefits the higher-
earning spouse. That higher-earning spouse bears a smaller tax bur-
den by filing jointly than he or she would by filing separately. 
12. This pattern does not exist for couples who live in any of the nine community property 
states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wis-
consin. Couples in community property states compute separate return tax liability no differ-
ently than joint return liability because they are required to split their incomes even when filing 
separately. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 {1930); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTER· 
NAL REVENUE SERVICE, PuBLICATION 555, FEDERAL TAX INFoRMATION ON CoMMUNITY PROP· 
ERTY {1995) (hereinafter PuBLICATION 555]. Therefore, wives living in community property 
states would pay as much tax by filing separately as they would by filing jointly. Apart from the 
issue of joint and several liability, these wives would be no worse off financially by filing jointly. 
13. Christian, supra note 8. 
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By contrast, the tax attributable to the lower-earning spouse is 
greater under the joint return than it would be under separate :filing. 
Income splitting and aggregation combine to cause this result. Income 
splitting alone could place the lower-earning spouse in a lower tax 
bracket, but when applied in combination with aggregation, half of 
that spouse's lower income would be increased by half of the other's 
higher income. The combination of income splitting and aggregation 
acts to push the lower-earning spouse into a higher bracket than 
would have applied had his or her own income been taxed separately. 
For the lower-earning spouse the harm from aggregation exceeds the 
benefit that income splitting confers. Consequently, the lower-earn-
ing spouse pays more tax by filing jointly than he or she would by 
filing separately. Relative to separate return filing, the joint return 
rates increase the tax attributable to the lower-income spouse and 
reduce the tax attributable to the higher-income spouse. 
This pattern, present when a couple files jointly, operates in a 
social context in which husbands tend to earn more than their wives, 14 
and thus, tends to redound to the benefit of husbands and to the detri-
ment of wives. 
14. In 1994, the median income for married men whose wives were present substantially 
exceeded the median income for married women whose husbands were present. The median 
income for married men was $28,377, while that of married women was only $11,859. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, CuRRENT PoPULATION REPORTS, SERIES 
P-60, INcoME STATISTICS BRANCH!HHES DIVIsioN, Table P-11 (visited 1997) <http:l/ 
www.census.gov/income/p11.txt (Table P-11 on file with Southern California Review of Law and 
Women's Studies). These figures include incomes not only from full-time workers but also the 
incomes of spouses who work part-time and the incomes from those who do not participate at all 
in the labor force. A recent New York Tunes article reports that the wage gap between men and 
women has begun to widen. Tamar Lewin, Wage Difference Between Women and Men Widens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at Al. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the curren! pattern in 
which husbands earn more than their wives will cease to exist anytime soon. 
In 1989, wives earned more than ·their husbands in only 18% of marriages. See Diane Cris-
pell, More Bacon, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 1989, at 9 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, 
EARNINGS OF MARRIEo-CouPLE FAMILIES: 1987, CuRRENT PoPULATION REPoRTS, Series P-60, 
No. 165 (1989)). In 1994, 18.9% of wives earned more than their husbands. This figure was 
derived by adding together the number of couples in which wives with earnings earned more 
than their husbands who had earnings {7,218,000) and the number of couples in which the wife 
worked while the husband did not (2,958,000) and dividing that sum by the total number of 
married couples (53,865,000). See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
CuRRENT PoPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, Income Statistics Branch/HHES Division, Table 
F-19 (supplying 7,218,000 and 53,865,000 figures), Table F-13 (providing the 2,958,000 and 
53,865,000 figures) (visited 1997) <http:l/www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f.19.html; <http:l/ 
www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f.l3.html (Tables on file with Southern California Review of 
Law and Women's Studies). 
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To the extent the higher-earning husband pays less upon filing 
jointly and the lower-earning wife pays more, joint filing in effect 
results in a transfer of wealth from wife to husband. Upon filing 
jointly, the tax attributable to the husband's income decreases more 
than the amount by which the wife's tax increases. Thus, as a unit, the 
couple is better off filing jointly rather than separately. Essentially, 
part of the reduction in tax attributable to the husband's income 
comes at the expense of the U.S. Treasury in the form of a smaller 
overall tax bill. However, part of his reduction comes at his wife's 
expense. It is this amount-the amount by which the wife's tax 
increases-which she effectively transfers to her husband by filing 
jointly rather than separately. This pattern would not be so objection-
able if women could realistically avoid income splitting and aggrega-
tion by filing separately. However, separate returns are rarely a 
practical solution for most families because they almost uniformly 
increase the tax liability of the family vis-a-vis the joint return and, 
therefore, are rarely used.15 Joint returns reduce the tax on the family 
overall, but as between the spouses, they tend to increase the tax 011 
the wife and to grant an economic benefit to the husband. 
How much does the wife transfer to her husband? How much 
does the tax attributable to the wife's income increase by filing jointly 
rather than separately? The answer to these questions depends 011 
how the couple apportions its joint return liability. Couples who file 
jointly may divide their tax liability in any manner they choose. No 
rule exists mandating one approach over another because jointly filing 
15. In 1993, an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were joint returns 
and an estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These figures were derived from the 
following statistics compiled by the Internal Revenue Service. In 1993, 48,298,687 returns in 
which spouses filed jointly were submitted to the IRS. Only 2,437,311 separate returns were 
filed by married taxpayers. See DEPARTMENT OF TiiE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
PUBLICATION 1304, STATISTICS OF INcoME 1993, lNDrviDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (revised 
Mar. 1996). Consequently, the total number of returns filed by married taxpayers can be esti· 
mated to be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687, or 95.2%, were joint returns. 
When one spouse files separately, the other may also file separately or not at all depending 
on whether that other spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing requirement. An esti· 
mate of the number of such couples would be half of the number of separate returns filed in 1993 
or half of2,437,311. This is not a precise estimate, however, because undoubtedly some spouses 
of separate filers did not file any return. Nevertheless, assuming 1,218,656 couples filed sepa· 
rately, the total number of married couples who filed returns would amount to 49,517,343 and 
the percentage of couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as 48,298,687 divided by 
the total number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this manner the percentage of couples 
who filed jointly could be estimated at 97.5%. 
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spouses are jointly and severally liable for any unpaid tax.16 A variety 
of approaches to apportionment of the joint return liability are defen-
sible. One approach would be simply ~o divide the total tax liability in 
half under the theory that the spouses share all expenses equallyP 
This approach, hereafter referred to as 50-50 apportionment, is not 
rational in theory because the amount of tax each spouse generates 
should depend on the amount of income each earns. Nevertheless, 
many couples probably divide their tax liabilities in half in any 
event.18 Under another approach, hereafter referred to as relative-
net-income apportionment, the tax burden would be attributed to the 
16. See I.R.C. § 6013( d)(3) (West Supp. 1997). From the perspective of the IRS, the appor-
tionment method spouses use to divide their joint tax liability between them is irrelevant 
because the IRS can proceed against either or both spouses for the entire amount of any joint 
return tax deficiency. See, e.g., In re Richmond, 456 F.2d 458, 462 (3d Cir. 1972), affg 322 F. 
Supp. 888 (D.NJ. 1970). Because couples can divide their joint return tax in any manner they 
choose, the true incidence of the tax between husbands and wives is difficult to determine. 
Empirical research should be conducted to determine how spouses, in fact, apportion their joint 
return liabilities. 
17. In Van Vleck v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 433 (1934), affd, 80 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.1935), 
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936), spouses voluntarily divided their 1930 tax bill evenly between 
them even though only the wife had net income for the year. The husband had experienced a 
net loss in 1930. Van Vleck illustrates that spouses sometimes split their joint tax liability in half 
even when one earns more than the other. 
When the Commissioner collects a joint return deficiency from one spouse under the rule of 
joint and several liability, that spouse may seek contribution from the other in state court. In 
such contribution actions, some state courts have apportioned the couple's joint tax deficiency 
half to each spouse even when the spouses had unequal earnings. See Rude v. Commissioner, 48 
T.C. 165 (1967) (discussing whether wife could deduct as a nonbusiness bad debt the amount her 
husband owed her pursuant to an earlier right of contribution judgment from a California state 
court and finding that she could not); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 P.2d 505 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) 
(apportioning joint tax deficiency half to each spouse under both law and the agreement 
between the parties); Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 757 (Kan. 1954) (husband entitled to 
contribution where he paid over one-half of the deficiencies); Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 416 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (wife entitled to contribution from husband's estate of one-half of the 
interest assessed for deficiencies); Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1960) (wife was enti-
tled to contribution from husband for deficiencies on co=unity income and could deduct that 
amount from agreed-upon property settlement). Some spouses have been reported to divide 
other living expenses evenly even when one earned more than the other. See Beck, supra note 
11, at 380 (discussing findings of a survey by SHERE Hrre, WoMEN AND LoVE: A CuLTURAL 
REvoLUTION IN PROGRESS 445-47 (1987)); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: 
Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 82 n.54 (1993). 
Consequently, it is not inconceivable that spouses might divide their joint tax liability evenly 
although one has more income than the other. 
18. See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861 (1994) 
(proposing that errors of cognition often influence people to make "irrational" decisions in all 
areas of life, including tax). Cognitive errors may also impact how husbands and wives appor-
tion their joint tax liabilities. 
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spouses in proportion to their relative net incomes.19 Thus, the tax 
attributable to the husband would bear the same proportion to the 
total tax bill which his income bears to total income. A third 
approach, hereafter referred to as secondary-earner apportionment, 
would be to attribute tax first to the husband under the theory that, 
earning more, he is the primary breadwinner. The tax attributable to 
him would be the tax liability computed as if he were the only working 
spouse. The additional tax under joint filing would not have arisen 
had the wife chosen not to work and, therefore, would be attributable 
to her. 
An example using these methods for apportioning joint return 
liability illustrates how joint return rates, relative to separate rates, 
result in a transfer of wealth from the lower-earning spouse, usually 
the wife, to the higher-earning spouse, usually the husband. Consider 
a case in which a husband earns $80,000 and his wife earns $40,000.20 
Joint return liability would amount to $29,729.21 Under 50-50 appor-
tionment, $14,864 would be attributed to each spouse. Under relative 
net income apportionment, the tax attributable to the husband would 
be two-thirds of the total since his income comprises two-thirds of the 
couple's total income. The portion of the joint return tax attributable 
to the husband would be $19,819, and that attributable to the wife 
would be $9,910. Under secondary-earner apportionment, $17,603 
would be attributable to the husband and $12,126 would be attributa-
ble to the wife. Contrast these amounts with the tax liabilities result-
ing from separate filing: $21,564 for the husband and $8,802 for the 
wife. Regardless of which apportionment method is the most appro-
priate, the husband benefits financially from the decision to file 
jointly. He pays $14,864, $19,819 or $17,603, by filing jointly versus 
the greater amount of $21,564 by filing separately. Conversely, the 
19. Before Congress adopted the rule of joint and several liability, when federal courts had 
occasion to apportion joint return liability to determine which spouse should pay a tax defi· 
ciency, they consistently used this second method, ruling that joint tax liability should be divided 
between the spouses on the basis of their respective net incomes. See Commissioner v. Rabe· 
nold, 108 F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940); Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487, 489 (9th Cir. 
1935); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874, 877 (1938); see also Miller v. Miller, 310 N.Y.S.2d 
18, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (state contribution action in which state court divided a federal tax liability 
between the spouses on the basis of their respective net incomes). 
20. Given the average earnings of husbands and wives from the census data enumerated in 
note 14, supra, the assumption that a husband earns twice as much as his wife is not unrealistic. 
21. All tax computations utilize the rate schedules in I.R.C. §§ 1(a) and (d), unadjusted for 
inflation, for married individuals filing joint returns and for married individuals filing separate 
returns, respectively. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416, 
458. All computations are rounded to the nearest dollar or percentage point. 
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wife is harmed from the decision to file jointly regardless of the 
method used to apportion the joint tax liability between the spouses. 
Her tax liability would have been only $8,802 had she filed separately 
in contrast to liability attributable to her of either $14,864, $9,910, or 
$12,126 by filing jointly. This decrease in the husband's tax liability 
and the increase in the wife's tax liability result from the combined 
operation of income splitting and aggregation. By filing jointly, rather 
than separately, the husband has benefitted. Under the relative-net-
income approach, the apportionment method least harmful to the 
wife, he has benefitted by $1,745. While a portion of his gain comes at 
the expense of the U.S. Treasury, the other $1,108 comes at the 
expense of his lower-earning wife. Accordingly, the wife has essen-
tially transferred $1,108 to her higher-earning husband by agreeing to 
file jointly. This pattern is objectionable not only on vertical equity 
grounds because it applies to force a lower-earning spouse to transfer 
wealth to a higher-earning spouse, but also on feminist grounds 
because it generally applies to require transfers from women to men. 
A number of points concerning this pattern in which the wife 
pays more and the husband pays less by filing jointly are noteworthy. 
First, under this pattern, the increase in the wife's tax is very severe 
for her on a percentage basis because of her lower income while the 
reduction in tax to the husband provides a relatively modest benefit to 
him on a percentage basis because of his greater income. Under rela-
tive-net-income apportionment, the percentage increase in the wife's 
tax as a result of filing jointly rather than separately is 13%,22 while 
the percentage decrease in the husband's tax from joint filing is only 
8%.23 The harm to the wife is more exacting from her perspective 
than the benefit to the husband is helpful from his point of view. 
Under secondary-earner apportionment, the percentage increase in 
the wife's tax as a result of joint filing is 38%24 while the percentage 
decrease in the husband's tax is only 18%.25 Alternatively, under 50-
50 apportionment, the percentage increase in the wife's tax as a result 
22. The percentage increase in the wife's tax from filing jointly is computed by subtracting 
her separate tax liability from her portion of the joint tax liability and then by dividing by her 
separate tax liability: ($9,910- $8,802) + $8,802 = 13%. 
23. The percentage decrease-in the husband's tax from filing jointly is computed by sub-
tracting his portion of the joint tax liability from his separate liability and then by dividing by his 
separate liability: ($21,564 - $19,819) + $21,564 = 8%. 
24. ($12,126 - $8,802) + $8,802. 
25. ($21,564- $17,603) + $21,564. 
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of joint filing is a staggering 69%26 while the percentage decrease in 
the husband's tax is only 31%.27 
Even more alarming, the dollar amount of the transfer of wealth 
from the wife to her husband generally increases the less she earns in 
relation to him. In general, the greater the disparity in spousal 
incomes, the more benefit the lower-earning wife transfers to her 
higher-earning husband by filing jointly rather than separately. For 
example, assuming the husband and wife had respective earnings of 
$100,000 and $20,000, rather than the $80,000 and $40,000 described 
above, total earnings would remain the same but relative earnings 
would diverge even more. Under this scenario, the total joint return 
liability would remain $29,729. Under relative-net-income apportion-
ment, the husband's share of this joint return liability would be 
$24,774 and that of his wife would be $4,955. By contrast, had these 
spouses filed separately, the husband's separate tax liability would 
have been $28,764 while the wife's would have been only $3,202. 
Under relative-net-income apportionment, this wife has lost $1,753 by 
filing jointly rather than separately while her husband has gained 
$3,991. Although a portion of his gain comes at the expense of the 
U.S. Treasury, the other $1,753 comes at the expense of his lower-
earning wife. In this case, the wife has essentially transferred $1,753 
to her higher-earning husband. Note that the spouses' incomes are 
much more disparate in this case, $100,000/$20,000, than in the 
$80,000/$40,000 example discussed previously. In the $80,000/$40,000 
example, relative-net-income apportionment resulted in a transfer of 
only $1,108 from the lower-earning wife to her husband. The greater 
the disparity in spousal incomes, that is, the less the wife earns in rela-
tion to her husband, the more she transfers to him by agreeing to file 
jointly. 
The fact that tax rates are structured to encourage joint filing 
when one spouse earns more than the other, and the fact that joint 
rates then effectively cause a transfer from the lower-income to the 
higher-income spouse result in transfers of wealth from the "poorer" 
to the "richer" spouse precisely because of the disparity in spousal 
incomes. This incentive structure is contrary to notions of ability to 
pay. It is even more ironic and regressive that the amount of the 
transfer should increase in severity for the lower-earning spouse in 
absolute dollar terms the less she earns in relation to her husband. 
26. ($14,864 - $8,802) + $8,802. 
27. ($21,564 - $14,864) + $21,564. 
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Some critics might argue that the wife has not been forced to 
transfer any wealth to her husband by filing jointly. They would note 
that, as a unit, the couple is better off filing jointly than separately 
because, as a unit, less tax must be paid. Consequently, more 
resources remain available for the benefit of all the family members, 
including the wife.28 While it is true that couples usually pay less tax 
when filing jointly rather than separately, it does not necessarily fol-
low that more resources remain available for the benefit of all family 
members. The observation by critics does not alter the fact that the 
savings from joint filing is due entirely to the reduction in tax attribu-
table to the husband's income, a reduction that exceeds the increase in 
tax attributable to the wife's income. While the couple, as a unit, is 
better off by filing jointly, the only way the wife can be viewed as 
having benefitted individually from the decision to file jointly is if she 
has equal access to her husband's substantial tax savings.29 The 
assumption that any extra resources from filing jointly would, in fact, 
be available to the wife is far from certain. Spouses are required 
neither to share nor to pool their resources, nor even to live together 
to be eligible to file jointly.30 
Whether or not the wife has access to the tax her husband saves 
by filing jointly depends on whether or not she has access to his post-
tax earnings since his tax savings is one component of those post-tax 
earnings. Many factors coalesce to suggest that in general a wife does 
not have real access to her husband's post-tax earnings. First, the 
property laws of common law states fail to guarantee a wife access to 
her husband's earnings during the marriage.31 Federal tax law reflects 
28. See Mcintyre, Prolegomena, supra note 7, at 483 n.3l. 
29. See Beck, supra note 11, at 376 (noting that wives may receive no benefit from the tax 
savings due to income splitting unless tax reductions their husbands obtain are assumed to bene-
fit the wives); cf. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional 
Choices, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 2001,2029-30, 2050-51 (1996) (acknowledging in other contexts that 
women may not benefit individually from tax savings accorded to the family). 
30. See Beck, supra note 11, at 378. See also I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West Supp. 1997) (listing 
situations in which husbands and wives are barred from filing jointly, but failing to mention 
living apart or keeping assets and earnings segregated). 
31. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 51 (1996) (noting that "nothing in family law requires couples to share their 
monetary income"). The non-earning spouse may obtain rights in the other's saved earnings 
only when the marriage terminates, either by death or upon divorce. See Scott Greene, Compar-
ison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property 
Systems and their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and 
the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 71, 87, 110-11 (1979); Elizabeth A. Cheadle, Com-
ment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 
UCLA L. REv. 1269, 1269 n.2, 1312 (1981); Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment of 
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that fact by precluding income splitting for separately filing couples 
who live in common law jurisdictions.32 In the forty-two common law 
jurisdictions33 where wives are worse off filing jointly than sepa-
rately,34 federal law does not permit income splitting to separately fil-
ing spouses because state law does not give one spouse a present 
ownership interest in the other's earnings. This very lack of a present 
property interest in her husband's earnings precludes a wife in these 
states from enjoying the right to share in her husband's joint return 
tax savings during the marriage. 
Second, although the wife would have access to her husband's tax 
savings if they were to pool their resources voluntarily, empirical data 
suggest that a significant percentage of couples do not pool 
resources35 and that the practice of sharing seems to be diminishing in 
frequency.36 As a result, a substantial number of wives do not have 
access to their husbands' tax savings through voluntary sharing. 
Third, while spouses may report that they share their earnings, 
sociological data indicate that spouses who do "share" resources do 
Unearned Separate Property at Divorce in Common Law Property Jurisdictions, 1990 Wis. L. 
REv. 903, 907; Keith D. Ross, Note, Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors Under the Uniform 
Marital Property Act, 69 MINN. L. REv. 111, 117 (1984). Even in the context of divorce where 
common law property states sometimes give a wife access to her "husband's property," discre-
tion is often left to a judge to divide the property fairly between the spouses. However, the 
"uncertainty of this method is unsatisfactory to the economically dependent spouse, who has no 
automatic right to a part of the property." Gann, supra note 1, at 48 (emphasis added). 
32. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Publication 555 limits separate return income 
splitting to couples living in community property states. See PuBUCATION 555, supra note 12. 
33. The forty-two common law jurisdictions consist of the forty-one non-community prop-
erty states and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is a common law jurisdiction. 
See Osborn, supra note 31, at 903 n.l. 
34. An examination of whether wives living in community property states have access to 
their husbands' tax savings under state law is unnecessary for purposes of this analysis. Wives in 
those states are normally no worse off by filing jointly than they would be by filing separately 
because of the income splitting that is required of separately filing spouses who reside in commu-
nity property jurisdictions. See supra notes 2 through 12, and accompanying text. 
35. See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CoUPLES 101, Figure 9 
(1983) (surveying whether or not couples believe in pooling money and finding that the belief is 
not universal: 69% of wives and 75% of husbands of the couples surveyed believed in pooling); 
RosANNA HERTZ, MoRE EQUAL THAN OTHERs: WoMEN AND MEN IN DuAL-CAREER MAR-
RIAGES 90-91 (1986) (finding in her survey that only 48% of the couples surveyed claimed to 
pool their money); SHERE RITE, WoMEN AND LoVE: A CuLTURAL REvoLUTION IN PROGRESS 
431-49 (1987); JAN PAHL, MoNEY AND MARRIAGE 78, 186 (1989) (only 56% of couples claimed 
to share); Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 86 (discussing the results of her own empirical surveys: 
30% of couples in one survey and 44.4% in the other survey claimed that at least some wages 
were not kept in joint accounts). 
36. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 109; Beck, supra note 11, at 380; Korn-
hauser, supra note 17, at 81, 91; Ross, supra note 31, at 134. 
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not do so in a meaningful way. Each spouse's relative freedom to use 
the resources for his or her own benefit may differ substantially, indi-
cating that control and, therefore, money is not really shared.37 The 
higher-earning spouse generally controls how such resources will be 
used. Therefore, even when couples do pool nominally, the power, 
status and freedom to decide how money is used tend to be allocated 
to the higher earner, usually the husband.38 This pattern is reflected 
in the findings of numerous sociological studies that nominal pooling 
of income does not mean that control over that income is shared.39 "If 
one person dominates the decision-making process, true sharing can-
not exist."40 "The lack of sharing may be subtle, discernable for 
example only through a pattern of deference by the wife to the hus-
band's decisions."41 Consequently, even when a couple claims to 
37. See, e.g., PAHL, supra note 35, at 57; Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 81-82, 81 n.53, 83 & 
n.55; Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: "Special Monies," 95 AM. J. Soc. 342, 
352-77 (1989) (families operate as hierarchical groups-one person controls the allocation and 
use of money); cf. Ross, supra note 31, at 134-35 (noting that even when spouses have the legal 
obligation to pay the other's liabilities, they do not necessarily believe they must do so or that 
they must share resources in other ways). 
38. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 11, at 380-81 (women report having to ask permission from 
their husbands to make purchases unless they earn significant amounts themselves); id. at 381 
n.296 (owner controls use of earnings); Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the 
Management and Control Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 GoNz. L. REv. 235,251-55 
(1995); Jones, supra note 6, at 274 (noting that the earner generally controls how earnings will be 
used); Zelenak, supra note 1, at 355. 
39. See, e.g., BARBARA BERGMANN, THE EcoNoMic EMERGENCE oF WOMEN 211-12 
(1986) (men as primary wage earners have retained control over consumption patterns); BLUM-
STEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 53-56; PAHL, supra note 35, at 146-51 (women married to 
wealthy men often lack resources for leisure activities although their husbands do not); id. at 143 
(women married to wealthy men may lack sufficient funds for necessities); Christine Delphy & 
Diana Leonard, Class Analysis, Gender Analysis and the Family, in GENDER AND STRATIFICA-
TION 57-73 (Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann eds., 1986) (unequal food distribution within 
the family undermines the assumption of equal sharing of resources and power; there is a 
"marked hierarchy of consumption within families"); Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the 
Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366-76 
(1981) (arguing that men more often than women control how income will be used and for 
whose benefit); Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Mar-
riage, 31 Soc. REv. 237, 251-58 (1983); Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money within the Household, 
in THE STATE, THE LAw, AND THE FAMILY: CrunCAL PERSPECTIVES 36 (Michael D.A. Freeman 
ed., 1984); Michael Young, Distribution of Income within the Family, 3 BRIT. J. Soc. 305, 305 
(1952) (historically men disproportionately benefit from family resources: "the bread-winners 
are often the meat-eaters"); id. at 313-14 (describing the practice whereby husbands provide only 
limited access to their resources through an allowance system rather than by providing indiscrini-
inate access). 
40. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 88; see also Beck, supra note 11, at 380 (noting that the 
determination of which spouse has control over spending decisions is relevant to knowing 
whether those spouses share resources). 
41. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 106. 
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share resources, if the lower-earning wife lacks meaningful access to 
her husband's tax savings, she will, indeed, be worse off by filing 
jointly·than separately. 
The confluence of this social reality of control over resources by 
the higher-earning spouse and the structure of joint return rates poses 
a particularly striking irony. A couple in which the husband's earn-
ings substantially exceed those of his wife is less likely to practice true 
sharing than other couples with closer incomes. As described above, 
joint, rather than separate, filing produces the largest transfer of 
wealth from wives to husbands for precisely the same couples-those 
in which spouses have the most disparate incomes. Ironically, this 
joint filing pattern is most harmful to wives in the very cases in which 
the wives would be least likely to have meaningful access to their hus-
bands' joint return tax savings. For couples in which spouses' incomes 
differ, not only must wives pay significantly more by filing jointly than 
they would by filing separately, but their husbands are also less likely 
to practice true sharing, so the harm to the wives is not mitigated 
because they do not acquire meaningful access to their husbands' tax 
savings. 
If women do not have meaningful access to their husbands' tax 
savings from joint filing, then joint filing, in fact, leaves those wives 
poorer than would separate filing. Even when wives do have access to 
their husbands' tax savings through voluntary sharing, the tax savings 
still belong to the husbands. Sharing men's resources through men's 
generosity is second best to women owning resources on their own as 
a matter of right.42 Husbands who voluntarily share their resources 
with their wives still enjoy the power and control that accompanies the 
concentration of assets in their hands. "[S]uperior earnings are 
rewarded with dominant control."43 Consequently, even if spouses 
share resources in a meaningful way, so that the wife may avoid eco-
nomic harm upon filing jointly and so that she may effectively share in 
42. Cf. SusAN MoLLER OKIN, JuSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 30-31 (1989) (suggesting 
that one spouse's generosity is inadequate to ensure justice within the family); Gillian K. Had-
field, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEo. 
L.J. 89, 107 {1993) (arguing that the gender wage gap should be eliminated "to secure women's 
ability to ensure their own well-being rather than being dependent on transfers from a spouse or 
the government"); Davis, supra note 1, at 218 (noting that assumed sharing should not be the 
standard assumption which is incorporated into the law: "as a justification for refusing to accord 
women equal advantages in the economic or legal spheres, spousal interdependence .•• should 
not be accepted"). 
43. De Armond, supra note 38, at 253. 
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her husband's tax savings, the fact that wives must rely on their hus-
bands' generosity to enjoy the tax savings has a harmful pedagogical 
effect.44 The effect of the law is to convey messages to society that 
reinforce traditional male and female gender roles. The tax law 
teaches harmful messages about men's and women's identities by 
allowing women to benefit only through their husbands' benevolence. 
The tax law establishes a pattern whereby wives must consistently 
request money from their husbands, money to which they should have 
had access by right. In doing so, the law portrays the husband as a 
provider, a generous contributor, a chief financial officer and an 
authority figure, while it portrays the wife as a beggar, a burden, a 
consumer and a dependent. This pattern in the tax law perpetuates 
marriage as an institution in which men economically dominate 
women. The fact that men are granted dominance in relationships 
because they are regarded as the owners of economic resources is fur-
ther exacerbated by the fact that joint filing relative to separate filing 
directs even more money to husbands and even less to wives. Tax law 
arguably should not be allowed to perpetuate or contribute to such 
stereotypes. 
The Tax Code relies on the marital sharing of assets in an effort to 
achieve a just result, in an effort to allow both spouses to benefit eco-
nomically from the financial incentive to :file jointly. Voluntary 
resource sharing within the marital unit, however, is not a sufficient 
solution to the pattern whereby husbands are made better off and 
wives are made worse off by :filing jointly rather than separately. First, 
as noted above, many spouses do not practice sharing. Second, even 
for those couples who do purport to share, the government's reliance 
on sharing to correct an inequity in the tax system perpetuates the 
view of wives as drains on their "husbands"' resources. The tax law 
should neither rely on spousal sharing nor be structured to require 
44. Cf. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. 
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 
635 (1992) ("[l]aw ... disseminates [values and priorities] ... back to the populace to become 
part of conscious conventional wisdom"); De Armond, supra note 38, at 257 (suggesting that the 
messages in law have some power to transform society and arguing that "law is a belief system 
that helps define the role of the individual in society and relations with others, [and that] it can 
promote fulfilling, healthy roles for people and encourage them to relate in particular ways, and 
not in others"); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Mar-
ket Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 656 {1993) (recognizing a potential sym-
bolic danger of taxing men more than women, thereby implying both that the symbolic function 
of law is important and that law sends messages to society); Zelenak, supra note 1, at 365 & 
n.121 (implying that law, speci!ically the joint return, may be objectionable on the basis of inap-
propriate messages that it sends to the public). 
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that spouses share resources to enable wives to enjoy some of the 
financial benefit from filing jointly. 
In the absence of sharing, the joint return rate structure operates 
to force wives to transfer funds to their higher-earning husbands. If 
wives had meaningful access to their husbands' tax savings, joint filing 
would still effect a transfer of wealth from them to their husbands, but 
the practice of sharing would permit a subsequent reversal of that ear-
lier wealth transfer. As noted earlier, however, both legal rules 
regarding ownership rights and sociological data suggest that wives 
lack access to their husbands' savings. Without such access, each year 
when most lower-earning wives file jointly, the joint return rates cause 
them to transfer money to their higher-earning husbands. The joint 
return rate structure, analyzed in the context of social patterns in 
which husbands tend to earn more than their wives and in which 
spouses tend not to share their resources in a meaningful way, effects 
a significant wealth transfer from th~ lower-earning wife to her 
higher-income husband. 
This pattern in which the tax system participates in annual trans-
fers of wealth from wives to their husbands is especially troublesome 
given the incentive in the Code for most couples to file jointly rather 
than separately. As described in Part II, a divergence in spousal 
incomes triggers au incentive to file jointly. Joint filing, in tum, lowers 
the tax of the higher-earning husband and increases that of his lower-
earning wife relative to separate filing, thereby resulting in a transfer 
of wealth from the lower-income to the higher-income spouse. 
Through the operation of the joint return rates and the incentive those 
rates create to file jointly, the fact that a husband earns more than his 
wife essentially leads to a transfer of wealth from that poorer wife to 
her richer husband. Moreover, the greater the disparity in incomes, 
the larger the transfer from the wife to her husband. Such systematic 
transfers operate to keep money out of women's hands and perpetu-
ate the economic superiority of men over women. Through the opera-
tion of the joint return rates, a disparity in incomes functions to 
perpetuate economic inequality. The incentive to file jointly when one 
spouse earns more than the other essentially locks women into the 
harmful patterns that arise under the joint return. 
Admittedly, spouses could divide their joint return tax liability in 
a manner that would allow both to share in the joint return tax sav-
ings. For example, one equitable method for apportioning the joint 
tax liability between the husband and wife, one that differs from the 
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apportionment methods described above, would be to split that liabil-
ity in proportion to the spouses' respective liabilities had they filed 
separately. Using the example in which the husband and wife earn 
$80,000 and $40,000 respectively, this approach would allocate $21,112 
of the $29,729 joint tax to the husband and $8,617 to his wife.45 Under 
this apportionment method both spouses benefit financially from fil-
ing jointly. Consequently, this apportionment method is the most 
desirable.46 Nevertheless, apportioning joint return tax liability in this 
manner is inappropriate when analyzing which spouse benefits by fil-
ing jointly rather than separately because when a couple pays its joint 
return tax liability, it is unlikely that each spouse contributes to the 
payment based on relative separate return liabilities. First, no tax 
rules apply in this context to instruct the couple to apportion its joint 
return tax in this manner. Second, the vast majority of the population 
is unlikely to consider apportioning joint tax liability in this manner.47 
45. These amounts are computed as follows: 
$21,564 (husband's MFS liability) 
$30,366 (total MFS liability) x $29,729 (MFJ tax) = $21,112 (husband's portion of joint tax) 
$ 8,802 (wife's MFS liability) $2 (MF ) $ ( . . . . ) $30,366 (total MFS liability) x 9,729 J tax = 8,617 wife's portiOn of the JOmt tax 
46. In fact, the government has adopted this apportionment method for use in a variety of 
contexts but notably not to instruct joint filers how to divide their joint tax liabilities fairly. See 
Rev. Rul. 80-6,1980-1 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 80-7,1980-1 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 80-8,1980-1 C.B. 298; 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(f) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 1.6654-2(e) (as amended 1985); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6015(b)-1(b) (as amended 1976). If Congress ever repeals the rule of joint and several liabil-
ity, it should adopt in its place an apportionment method which divides the joint tax liability on 
the basis of the spouses' respective tax liabilities had they filed separately, and it should instruct 
taxpayers that this method is the fairest manner for dividing their joint return tax liability. See 
Beck, supra note 11, at 389 & n.341, 393-95. Apportioning joint return liabilities on the basis of 
respective separate return liabilities is more appropriate than doing so on the basis of respective 
net incomes because the former method permits the lower-earning spouse to share in the finan-
cial benefit of joint filing. 
47. In an informal survey of attorneys conducted by this author, sixty-three percent of 
respondents reported that the fairest way to divide joint return tax would be according to the 
spouses' respective net incomes. Twelve percent thought that it would be fairest to apportion 
the joint tax either according to the spouses' respective net incomes or on a fifty-fifty basis. Only 
twenty-five percent thought of splitting the liability in proportion to the respective separate 
return tax liabilities. If three-quarters of attorneys, individuals who tend to be educated in gen-
eral tax principles, do not think to split the joint return tax in proportion to separate tax liabili-
ties, then the average couple is very unlikely to think of splitting the joint tax in that manner. Of 
course, limitations on the usefulness of such a survey include the fact that respondents were 
simply asked their opinion. Had respondents actually been preparing their own tax returns and 
deciding whether to file jointly or separately, they might have discovered that apportionment on 
the basis of separate return liabilities rendered a different result than apportionment on the basis 
of respective net incomes. Most spouses probably do bear the joint return liability using a 50-50 
split or in proportion to their respective net incomes. 
It should be noted that some individuals, probably only tax accountants, apportion joint 
return liability between spouses in a manner that approximates the correct method, according to 
HeinOnline -- 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Studies 462 1996-1997
462 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 6:443 
Thus, spouses who segregate their resources and divide each expendi~ 
ture, including the joint return tax bill, most likely contribute equally 
or in proportion to their respective net incomes, rather than in pro-
portion to what their respective separate tax liabilities would have 
been if computed. 
When given the opportunity to apportion joint return liability, 
even courts have consistently failed to do so on the basis of respective 
separate return liabilities. In state contribution actions where federal 
joint return tax liabilities were apportioned between spouses, not one 
reported state court decision stated that the joint return tax should be 
divided according to the spouses' respective separate return tax liabili~ 
ties.48 Rather, state courts apportioned joint return liability between 
respective separate return liabilities. They have been reported to divide that liability on the 
basis of the spouses' respective liabilities had they been single. Under this method, both spouses 
benefit economically from filing jointly rather than separately. See Ellen E. Schultz, How to Split 
the Tax Bill with Your Spouse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1993, at C1 (noting that some couples arc 
more frequently asking their return preparers to determine how to divide underpayments 
between the spouses, indicating both that most individuals do not know how to do this fairly on 
their own and that many do not share resources). Empirical research should be conducted to 
determine on a more formal basis how most spouses divide their joint return tax liabilities in 
practice. 
48. When, under the rule of joint and several liability, the Commissioner collects a joint 
return tax deficiency from one spouse even though his or her income or deductions did not 
contribute to the deficiency, then that spouse may bring a right-of-contribution action in state 
court against the other spouse. In the context of joint return tax liability, state courts have 
determined fair-share apportionment using a variety of methods, but no decision has reported 
apportioning the joint return tax on the basis of respective separate return liabilities. Rather, 
state courts have apportioned joint return tax liability in the following manners: (1) according to 
the spouses' respective net incomes, see Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So.2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1971) (party divided tax obligation in half and had it not been for policy against withholding 
alimony, court seemingly would have allowed contribution on the basis of respective earned 
incomes); Miller v. Miller, 310 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (wife required to contribute her share 
of tax assessment paid by her husband based on the ratio of her taxable income to total taxable 
income); (2) half to the husband and half to the wife, see Rude v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165 
(1967) (discussing whether wife could deduct as a nonbusiness bad debt the amount her husband 
owed her pursuant to an earlier right of contribution judgement from a California state court 
and finding that she could not); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 P.2d 505 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (under 
both law and an agreement between the parties); Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 757 (Kan. 
1954) (husband not barred due to divorce from recovering contribution from wife where he had 
paid over one-half of deficiency); Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1960) (where wife was 
ordered to pay one-half of value of community property to husband, she could deduct husband's 
one-half share of tax liability from property settlement); and (3) according to a property settle-
ment agreement or stipulation between the ex-spouses, see Gillman v. O'Connell, 574 N.Y.S.2d 
573 (App. Div. 1991) (agreement provided that any tax deficiency arising from the marriage 
would be apportioned to the spouse whose income or deductions generated the deficiencies); 
Gooden v. Wright, No. 14823, 1991 WL 57230 (Ohio Ct. App. Unrep. Apr. 18, 1991) (agreement 
provided that any common debts which included tax deficiencies would be paid entirely by the 
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the spouses by dividing it in half, by dividing it on the basis of respec-
tive net incomes, or in accordance with a property settlement agree-
ment between the ex-spouses. Moreover, prior to Congress' 
enactment of joint and several liability, federal courts sometimes had 
occasion to apportion joint tax liability between spouses. None of the 
federal courts addressing that issue apportioned the joint tax on the 
basis of the spouses' individual tax liabilities had they filed separately. 
Rather, those courts also ruled that joint tax liability should be appor-
tioned on the basis of the spouses' respective net incomes.49 If courts 
have apportioned joint return liabilities in a manner that prejudices 
the lower-earning spouse, usually the wife, then it should be expected 
that taxpayers will make the same errors.50 Without instruction, few 
couples would be likely to divide their joint return liabilities in a man-
ner that benefits both spouses. Until spouses are instructed that the 
ex-husband); Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 416 {Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (pursuant to a stipulation 
between the parties that half of the deficiency was attributable to each spouse). 
It should be noted that Rocha, Hanson, and Rude, three of the four decisions in which 
liability was attributed to the spouses on a fifty-fifty basis, involved couples who had been living 
in co=unity property jurisdictions. Dividing the joint return liability in half would have corre-
sponded with apportionment on the basis of respective separate return liabilities if the deficien-
cies in those cases resulted from unreported co=unity income. However, had a deficiency 
resulted from one spouse's improper deduction or an understated gain on the sale of separate 
property, then that deficiency should not be borne half by each separately filing spouse. In that 
instance, a fifty-fifty allocation would not correspond to apportionment on the basis of respec-
tive separate return liabilities. Given the absence of information documenting the reason for the 
deficiencies in Rocha, Hanson, and Rude, it is impossible to know whether or not the fifty-fifty 
allocation corresponds to apportionment on the basis of respective separate tax liabilities. None 
of these courts provided any indication in their opinions that they had thought about the appor-
tionment issue sufficiently. Furthermore, none of the decisions ever referred to apportionment 
on the basis of respective separate return liabilities. Had courts intended to apportion on that 
basis it seems reasonable to expect that they would have said so. It, therefore, seems unlikely 
that the three courts had intended to apportion the deficiencies on that basis. 
In general, state courts have not apportioned joint return liabilities in a manner that permits 
both spouses to share in the financial benefits of joint filing. Instead, they seem to apportion 
those liabilities in manners that benefit the higher-earning spouse and that harm the lower-earn-
ing spouse. 
49. See Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1940); Cole v. Commis-
sioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487,489 (9th Cir. 1935); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874, 877 (1938). 
By choosing to apportion joint return liability on the basis of respective net incomes rather than 
according to the spouses' respective liabilities had they chosen not to file jointly, the Ninth and 
Second Circuits as well as the court known for its expertise in tax matters, the Board of Tax 
Appeals, all failed to spread the burdens of joint filing fairly between the spouses. This error had 
the same effect of favoring the higher-earning spouse and harming the lower earner. Even fed-
eral courts have apportioned joint return liability improperly. 
50. Husbands prepare the joint tax return more often than wives. See Jerome Borison, 
Alice Through a Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from the Tax Court in 
Innocent Spouse Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q. 123, 126 (1996). Thus, spouses may be unlikely to divide 
joint return liability in a manner that would benefit wives. 
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fairest manner of dividing their joint tax liability is on the basis of 
their respective separate return liabilities, couples are unlikely to 
divide their liabilities on that basis. Consequently, apportioning joint 
return tax on that basis is inappropriate for purposes of analyzing 
which spouse benefits and which is harmed from joint filing as 
opposed to separate filing. 
Because spouses are unlikely to divide the joint return tax liabil-
ity in a manner that provides a tax savings to each spouse, joint rather 
than separate filing is likely to inure to the benefit of the higher earner 
and to harm the lower earner. In this area, lack of explicit instructions 
from the IRS51 and taxpayers' imperfect understanding regarding 
apportionment appear to combine, permitting couples to apportion 
their joint return liabilities improperly and in a manner which tends to 
benefit husbands and to harm wives. Thus, by filing jointly rather 
than separately, the tax the wife bears most likely increases. 
Economists have not adequately addressed the incidence of joint 
return tax as between spouses. Empirical studies are needed, not only 
on the question of how much tax each spouse pays upon submitting 
the joint return, but also on the patterns throughout the year of tax 
withholding for husbands versus wives. The issue of the incidence of 
income tax as between spouses is complicated further because of often 
unknown and varying practices regarding spousal sharing or non-shar-
ing of resources. As further empirical research addressing these issues 
is undertaken, a clearer picture should emerge concerning inter-
spousal transfers of wealth and the participation of the tax system in 
such transfers. 
Nevertheless, even if spouses divide their joint return liability in a 
manner that allows both to benefit vis-a-vis separate filing, the joint 
return rate structure remains problematic. Even before the incidence 
of joint return tax between the spouses is verified, even before empiri-
cal evidence demonstrates that spouses split their joint return liability 
in a manner that actually causes wives to pay more and husbands to 
pay less than under separate filing, the joint return rate structure 
remains subject to criticism as a formal matter because the formal 
components of joint rates, income splitting and aggregation, operate 
together to increase the tax attributable to the lower earner and to 
reduce the tax attributable to the higher earner. For the lower-earn-
ing wife, income splitting first reduces her income by half but then 
51. The 1996 1040 Forms and Instructions contain no guidance to taxpayers as to how to 
divide their joint return liabilities fairly when they owe additional tax upon filing. 
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aggregation adds back a larger amount, half of her husband's larger 
income. The operation of these two components of joint rates 
increases the tax attributable to the lower earner as a formal matter. 
Whether or not spouses actually divide their joint tax liability in a 
manner that causes the wife to pay more than she would by filing sep-
arately, the formal design of joint rates increases the tax attributable 
to the lower-earning wife. Joint rates are designed to cause lower-
earning wives to transfer wealth to their higher-earning husbands. 
In this regard, joint rates are objectionable as a policy matter 
regardless of the actual empirical incidence of tax between spouses. If 
the incidence of joint tax between spouses is such that a wife does not 
transfer wealth to her higher-earning husband, then that is true despite 
the formal structure of joint rates. The tax structure would, in that 
case, be objectionable itself and would be relying on spousal sharing 
to avoid the result it was designed to create. Plainly, the tax system 
should not rely on the dubious likelihood of spousal sharing to correct 
inequities that are formally built into the system. 52 Rather, the inequi-
ties should be removed. 
B. WoMEN CANNoT REALISTICALLY FILE SEPARATELY TO AvOID 
THE PROBLEMS THE JOINT RATE STRUCTURE IMPosEs: 
ONE MoRE CoNFLICT FOR WoMEN 
Although women can avoid the problems of joint filing by filing 
separately,53 doing so is not a realistic option in most situations 
because of the financial incentive most couples experience to file 
jointly. The only way a wife can avoid being taxed at higher rates and 
thereby avoid transferring some of her wealth to her higher-income 
husband, as well as avoid being discouraged from working altogether, 
is to insist on filing separately. However, if she does so, the couple's 
total tax bill will be higher. A woman who earns less than her hus-
band, therefore, faces a conflict: she may either (1) file jointly to mini-
mize the family's tax liability and bear a larger individual tax burden, 
thereby facing financial pressure not to work, or (2) file separately to 
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
53. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West Supp. 1997), requiring income aggregation, applies only 
when a joint return is filed. No analogous provision exists regarding separate returns. See John-
son v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 968 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Similarly, in the forty-one common 
law states and in the District of Columbia, income splitting is available only to joint filers. Com-
pare the brackets in I.R.C. §§ 1(a) and (d) (West Supp. 1997). 
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m1mmize the tax liability attributable to her own income while 
increasing the family's tax burden overall.54 
With regard to this conflict, a number of points are worthy of 
note. The interests of the primary breadwinner, usually the husband, 
tend to be aligned, giving him an obvious choice. He serves himself 
and his family by filing jointly, minimizing both his own tax burden 
and the family's total tax bill. By contrast, women face a conflict that 
men rarely face. Women may do either what is better for themselves, 
file separately, or do what is worse for themselves but better for the 
marital unit as a whole, file jointly.55 By filing separately, a wife may 
54. It should be noted that a husband would face the same conflict between individual 
versus family interests if he earned less than his wife. However, in most situations, husbands 
earn more than their wives and, therefore, tend not to face this conflict. 
55. Some critics might argue that women do not experience a conflict in choosing a filing 
status. In response to this observation, it should be noted that many wives who do not experi-
ence such a conflict simply do not understand the costs of filing jointly. They do not realize that 
by filing jointly rather than separately, the tax attributable to the lower-earning spouse increases, 
and they do not know that filing jointly exposes them to joint and several liability for their 
spouse's tax. Finally, they may not know about the aggregation effect or realize that it is one 
reason why their post-tax disposable earnings are so low. See generally McCaffery, supra note 18 
(asserting that cognitive error often induces incorrect decisions with regard to tax). 
Other critics might observe that even women who understand the costs of joint filing may 
not view themselves as experiencing a conflict because they may view their interests as aligned 
with those of their children. Consequently, women might not see themselves in conflict with 
their families in the context of choosing a filing status. In fact, if women bond with and feel 
responsible for their children, then they might not view their choice to file jointly and to benefit 
the marital unit as presenting any conflict at all. Such wives would prefer to file jointly to make 
more total resources available to their children. In response to this observation, one school of 
feminist legal scholars would argue that women's perceived alliance with children is really a 
method utilized by patriarchy to ensure the continued subjugation of women. See, e.g., Joan C. 
Williams, Deconstmcting Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 828-36, 841 {1989) (raising the argu· 
ment concerning women's perceived alignment \vith children in non-tax contexts). While this 
argument is subject to dispute, it does reinforce the notion that the wife's individual interests are 
often not aligned with those of the family. 
Even if a wife views her interests as consistent with those of her children, it should be noted 
that her decision to file jointly does not necessarily provide more resources to those children. It 
makes more resources available to her husband who may or may not use them to benefit the 
couple's children. 
Fmally, the fact that many women view themselves as aligned with their children does not 
alter the fact that filing jointly benefits the family unit by benefitting the husband and that it 
tends to be harmful to the wife as an individual. Any given wife may decide that the harm to 
herself from filing jointly is worth undergoing because of the offsetting benefit her family may 
experience. In making this determination, however, she has balanced the harm to herself against 
the benefits to her family and has implicitly faced the very conflict between self interest and 
group interest that was described above. Wives, like husbands, should be able to align them· 
selves with their families in choosing a filing status without harming their own financial interests. 
Justice within the family should not be set up to be in conflict with intimate, harmonious family 
ties. See OKIN, supra note 42, at 32. 
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experience resentment or, in some cases, physical harm from her hus-
band who prefers to file jointly.56 
Through the mechanisms of income splitting and aggregation, the 
tax system tends to create a situation in which women consistently 
face conflict, one in which their own individual interests are at odds 
with those of the family as a whole. Because the vast majority of mar-
ried couples file jointly, it is clear that many women are choosing 
others' interests over their own.57 Society already presents many seri-
ous dilemmas to women that men tend to escape, such as the conflict 
of whether to work for their own independence or to stay at home 
with their children,58 a decision that men may choose to consider but 
generally are not expected to face. These conflicts facing women 
could pose psychic costs to the extent that women are aware of 
them.59 The tax system should not impose additional psychic costs on 
women by presenting them with yet another conflict.60 
56. See, e.g., Estate of Aylesworth v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 134 (1955); Osborn v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 130 (1993) (illustrating instances in which wives filed jointly against 
their wishes, rather than separately, because of the threat of physical abuse); Beck, supra note 
11, at 332. 
57. Cf. Williams, supra note 55, at 823-24 (discussing generally how the dominant culture 
teaches women to "'choos[e]' to marginalize themselves"). Choosing to file jointly would be one 
example of that phenomenon. 
58. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEo. LJ. 1571, 1616 (1996) ("Women at 
every income level report that they experience extreme stress and fatigue when they struggle to 
balance waged work with household responsibilities."); Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to 
End Welfare: Where are the Women's Voices?, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 843, 846-47 (1994) (discussing 
the dilemma that women face of whether to work or to stay at home with their children); see also 
Sylvia A. Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 YALE LJ. 1769, 1771 (1986) 
(reviewing ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRisis IN LmERAL 
AMERICA (1984)) (discussing conflict women face between achieving in the public world and 
nurturing in the domestic sphere). 
59. Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 64 & n.2 (suggesting in the context of whether or not 
the second earner \viii enter or remain in the labor force that the joint return subjects the secon-
dary earner, usually the wife, to psychological stress). 
60. To the extent women and the public generally are not aware of the conflict, then the 
features of the joint return tax that cause this conflict, income splitting and aggregation, are 
problematic for another reason. The gendered nature of the joint filing system is generally 
unknown to the public. Any laws which are hidden from those subject to them are suspect as 
"secret" laws and, therefore, ought to have questionable authority. Georg Hegel has argued that 
law does not have authority unless it is known. See GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY oF RIGHI" 135 
(T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967)(1952)("Hence making a law is not to be repre-
sented as merely the expression of a rule of behaviour valid for everyone, though that is one 
moment in legislation; the more important moment, the inner essence of the matter, is knowl-
edge of the content of the law in its determinate universality."); see also JosEPH RAz, THE 
AUTHoRITY OF LAw: EssAYS ON LAw AND MoRALITY 51 n.9 (1979); THOMAS P. STEPHENS, 
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MixED CoURT 1911-27, at 78-82 (1992). 
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IV. REFORM 
. The system ought to be reformed. In addressing other problems 
caused by income splitting and aggregation, such as the fact that they 
discourage wives from working in the paid labor force, scholars have 
proposed eliminating the joint return altogether. Such a reform would 
eliminate both income splitting and aggregation and, therefore, would 
also have the beneficial impact of eliminating conflicts facing women 
as well as the pattern in which wives are forced to transfer wealth to 
their husbands every year at tax time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under normal circumstances, many U.S. socio-legal institutions 
operate to direct economic benefit to men automatically but not to 
women. In fact in sorrie instances, those institutions operate to direct 
benefit away from women. The pattern I have described in which 
joint return filing operates in the social context to effect a transfer of 
wealth from wives to their husbands is one example of this theme. 
The tax rate structure·is designed to induce the vast majority of mar-
ried couples to file jointly rather than separately. Upon filing jointly a 
tax savings inures to the husband. His taxes are lower than they 
would have been had he filed separately. In this manner, economic 
benefit from the incentive to file jointly flows to men automatically. 
By contrast, relative to separate filing, joint filing most likely increases 
the tax that the wife will bear. Not only does the economic benefit 
from joint filing not flow to women automatically, but economic 
resources are most likely automatically directed away from them. 
Wives, therefore, face a conflict between acting in their own interests 
and acting in the interest of the family as a whole. Husbands experi-
ence no such conflict. In the absence of some sort of affirmative cor-
rective action by the spouses, such as increased sharing or careful and 
correct apportionment of the joint return tax liability, the default sys-
tem provides economic benefit to men but imposes both economic 
detriment and conflict on women. 
The only means by which this harmful result for women can be 
avoided is for women to take corrective action. The burden falls on 
the wife to negotiate with her husband to convince him to share joint 
return tax savings. Under the current system, \vives are required to 
act in some way, to do more than merely exist to acquire a benefit. By 
contrast, husbands need not take any affirmative action, husbands 
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need not undertake any burden, to benefit under the current system. 
Economic benefit flows to men automatically. 
A more neutral tax system would be one in which both spouses 
benefit automatically from the incentives built into the tax structure. 
The spouses' interests would be aligned with each other and with 
those of the family unit. Not only would both spouses derive eco-
nomic benefit from filing jointly, but they would each obtain that ben-
efit without having to take any affirmative corrective action. The 
current rate structure is unjust not only because it tends to direct eco-
nomic benefit away from wives and towards husbands, but also 
because women must act to share in the economic benefit. Given cur-
rent social and legal realities, men may benefit merely by existing. For 
women to benefit, however, they must do more than simply be. 
This essay has described a neglected feature of joint versus sepa-
rate tax rates, a feature that exemplifies a broader pattern in which 
economic institutions are designed in the social context to benefit men 
automatically but not women. In the case of joint versus separate tax 
rates, the incentive to file jointly operates in the social context to 
transfer money from wives to their husbands. Men need not do any-
thing to benefit under the current socio-tax structure. Women, by 
contrast, must act if they hope to benefit or even to avoid harm under 
this system. Scholars should work to identify other areas, both within 
the tax system and outside of it, in which economic institutions are 
designed to benefit men automatically and to harm women. 
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